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Policy Forum Article
The European Union and China: The Need for a More Politicised
Relationship
Kerry Brown* and Sam Beatson
Abstract
China and the European Union (EU) in 2016
have one of the largest economic relationships
to the world, with a network of strategic dia-
logues covering areas from environment to ag-
riculture. Despite this, their relationship is a
hard one to encapsulate. President Xi Jinping's
idea of a ‘civilisational’ partnership seem ab-
stract, but at least opens up the possibility of
the EU conceptualizing its relationship with
China as not solely transactional, but some-
thing more political. This paper argues that
conferring Market Economy Status on China
will be a key issue in marking this transition
between the EU seeing its link with China
solely in economic terms, and looking for a
stronger political dimension. The conclusion
is that both sides can no longer pretend they
are simply trade blocks interacting with each
other.
1. The European Union and China:
Origins
The relationship between the European Union
(EU) and China is one of the most important
in the world today. And in terms of trade and
quantiﬁable ﬂows of goods, it is an impressive
one. In 2014, bilateral trade amounted to €466
billion (Figure 1). China was the EU's largest
source of imports and second largest export
market. Of the total trade of what is, in effect,
the world's greatest trade bloc, China consti-
tuted 13 per cent of all of the EU's business.1
This consisted overwhelmingly of trade in in-
dustrial products, accounting for 98 per cent
of the EU's imports and 95 per cent of exports
to and from China. Over the same period, only
the United States, with a combined total of US
$698 billion (€625 billion) had greater levels of
trade with the People's Republic (PRC).2
In terms of inward and outward investment,
too, the links are strong and strengthening. By
the end of 2013, the EU had €119 billion
invested in China, 50 per cent more than that
number 3years earlier. But this was still only
2 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI)
stocks in the PRC.3 China had a mere €16 bil-
lion invested back in the EU, coming in at less
than 1 per cent of its overall FDI stocks
* Brown: Lau China Institute, King's College,
London, UK; Beatson: Lau China Institute, King's
College, London, UK. Corresponding author:
Brown, email <kerry.brown@kcl.ac.uk>.
1. Source. European Commission Directorate General for
Trade: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/septem-
ber/tradoc_113366.pdf, accessed 13th March 2016.
2. Source: United States Census Bureau, https://www.cen-
sus.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html
3. Source. Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:EU_FDI_stocks_in_BRIC_coun
tries,_2008-2012,_EUR_billion.png
Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 412–419
doi: 10.1002/app5.152
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by JohnWiley& Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License,
which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial
and no modiﬁcations or adaptations are made.
bs_bs_bannerbs_bs_banner
(Figure 2).4 The much smaller economy of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ag-
gregate total of FDI into the 28 EU member
states comes to triple that directly sourced from
the PRC. However, given the growth inﬂows
over the last several years, this source may
have reached its zenith.
There is nothing particularly strange about
the importance of the EU Chinese economic
relationship. The original diplomatic recogni-
tion conferred on each other predated the exis-
tence of the EU and was between the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the People's
Republic in 1975. This was formalised by way
of the document, which still stands as the legal
basis of the relationship to this day, the ‘EEC
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement’.
In its preamble, this agreement ‘aims to intro-
duce a new stage, to promote and intensify
trade and to encourage the steady expansion
of economic cooperation in the mutual interest
of both parties’.5 It reads as a solidly trade fo-
cused agreement, granting most favoured na-
tion status on China for a number of goods
classes.
One of the anomalies is that despite no
agreement replacing the 1985 accord, with
the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1994 bringing the EU into existence, its
function and status changed. Far from being a
purely common trading block, the new treaty
set out a number of social and political aspira-
tions, some of which proved contentious even
within the new EU. The Social Chapter, for in-
stance, encoded certain working rights and so-
cial welfare levels, which the United Kingdom
for one negotiated an opt-out clause for. The
EU also started to ﬁgure much more strongly
as a community of values, not just economic
expediency, and became keen on promoting
this beyond its borders. From 1995 to 2015, it
also saw the accession of a group of new states,
more than doubling its membership by 15. For
China, therefore, a relationship which had ini-
tially focused purely on trade and transactions
developed a new and less straightforward di-
mension after 1994, one in which the EU
asserted a number of values and ideas which
became part of its internal and external iden-
tity. This legacy from their origins as simply
having a trading relationship and interaction
based on that has never gone away, despite
the clear fact that the EU now is not the
straightforward actor that the EEC was. The
two in the twenty-ﬁrst century are still partially
pretending to be living in another era. No won-
der they had challenges after 2000 when it was
clear this earlier model was no longer ﬁt for
purpose, and they needed to think about them-
selves and then their relationship with each
other in a very different way.
2. The Search for a New Framework
The period from 2002 to 2014 can be
categorised as one of mutual learning and was
dominated by an almost unconscious deepen-
ing politicisation of the relationship despite
neither side being willing to fully admit this.
Because of this cognitive mismatch, it was
marked by each side losing some of their illu-
sions about the other. This is neatly evidenced
by two Chinese State Council White Papers,
(formal articulations of government policy)
one issued in 2003 and the second in 2014. A
comparison of the language used in eachmarks
this journey of disillusionment in China's eyes.
The 2003 paper acknowledges that ‘the
European Union (EU) is a major force in the
world. The Chinese Government appreciates
the importance the EU and its members attach
to developing relations with China’. Under
the political chapter, the paper simply asks
the EU to ‘abide’ by the One China policy re-
garding Taiwan, to ‘promote the EU's under-
standing of Tibet’ and to ‘continue the human
rights dialogue’.6
Twelve years later, the language was differ-
ent. In the intervening years, a number of
events had posed hard questions about what
each meant to the other beyond raw trade and
goods, and shown a paucity of response on
4. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php/File:BRIC_FDI_stocks_in_the_EU,_2008-2012,
_EUR_billion.png
5. EUR Lex, European Law Database, http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:r14206
6. China EU Policy Paper, Ofﬁce of the State Council,
2003, at http://china.org.cn/e-white/20050817/index.htm
413Brown & Beatson: EU and China: More Politicised Relationship
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by JohnWiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
Figure 2 Foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂow and stocks European Union–China and China–European Union
2006–2015. NB. 2014 ﬂow data subject to revisions.
Figure 1 Trade in goods by sector 2006–2015
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both sides. The ﬁrst of these was the failure
after what were (at least in Chinese eyes) ini-
tially promising moves of the EU to lift the
arms embargo imposed on the PRC after the
Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. This
had been as a result of US pressure, and had
shown that in the security and military sphere,
the EU answered almost wholly to
Washington. The second was the continuing
refusal of the EU to grant China market econ-
omy (ME) status, even though the PRC had
entered the World Trade Organisation by
December 2001 and felt it had implemented
largely market friendly policies. The third
was a series of meetings at head of government
or head of state level between major European
countries and the Dalai Lama, the exiled
Tibetan religious leader.
China has long been sensitive to what is per-
ceived as international interference in matters it
regards as internal affairs. The ruling Commu-
nist Party of China (CPC) is therefore quick to
react with strong diplomatic language and ac-
tions to behaviour by other states and actors
construed as supporting political, social and re-
ligious separatism within its borders. Defence
ofthe uniﬁed and singular Chinese nation state
(currently embracing the PRC, and including
Hong Kong and Macau Hong Kong Special
Administrative Regions to the south, Taiwan
[island] by the PRC to the east, and the Tibet
and Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous regions to
the south and northwest) are priorities for
Beijing. Any moves by a party like the EU or
its member states to become involved, or to be
perceived as becoming involved with these is-
sues, is met with great resistance. These are
clearly signalled in the 2003 EU White Paper.
TheEU's failure to comeupearlierwith a coher-
ent uniﬁed response to these issuesmeant itwas
often shown to be disunited, and often manipu-
lated by the Chinese. A harder sense of its polit-
ical identity would have helped prevent this.
There was another factor that had a profound
impact on the EU China relationship, and
showed well how even matters ﬁrmly in the
economic realm carried immense political
meaning, indicating how the two are increas-
ingly interconnected. From 2008, the EU, once
a haven of economic stability and
predictability, became beset by crises in the
Eurozone. This eroded the its reputation in
terms of competent ﬁnancial governance, but
it also raised questions over its political stabil-
ity. With the expansion of the Union to 28
states by 2015, too, the coherence internally
of the EU became questionable to Chinese
leaders. Their language over this period be-
came more qualiﬁed and implicitly critical.
Their doubts about the economic solidity of
the whole EU project dented their overall con-
ﬁdence in its political basis. This showed that
at least in their minds they saw a clear connec-
tion between the two.7
In this context, it is not surprising that the
2014 second White Paper has sharper lan-
guage. Its preamble is also more focused:
‘The EU is China's important strategic partner
in China's efforts to pursue peaceful develop-
ment and multi-polarity of the world and a
key party that China can work with to achieve
industrialization, urbanisation, IT application
and agricultural modernization as well as its
‘two centennial goals’,’ it states. ‘To grow
China-EU relations is an integral part of
China's efforts to build long-term, steady and
healthy relations with major powers and a pri-
ority in its foreign policy.’ It then goes on to
structure the relationship in four key areas:
partnerships for peace, for growth, for reform,
and for civilisation, acknowledging that there
are ‘differences in history, cultural tradition,
political system and stage of economic devel-
opment as well as the increasing competition
between China and the EU in some sectors in
recent years.’8 On the issues of Taiwan, Tibet
and Human Rights, its language is particularly
forceful. Dialogue on human rights can only be
undertaken on the basis of ‘mutual respect and
7. See Kerry Brown, ‘Decision Time or Moment of Truth
for China and the EU?’ China Brief, Vol 11, Issue 21,
Jamestown University, November 11 2011, at http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
38659&no_cache=1#.VuWuhn2LRH0
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of
China, ‘China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the
China-EUComprehensive Strategic Partnership forMutual
Beneﬁt and Win-win Cooperation’, 2 April 2014, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t114340
6.shtml
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non-interference in internal affairs.’ It asks that
Taiwanese political ﬁgures ‘not be allowed to
visit the EU or its member states under any pre-
text’. It also asks that members of what it calls
the ‘Dalai group’ not to be allowed to the EU
‘under any capacity.’
Perhaps the 2014 paper was partly a re-
sponse to the one signiﬁcant document the
EU did produce in the previous decade on the
broader bilateral relationship, a communication
from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment from 2006, entitled ‘EU China, Closer
Partners, Growing Responsibilities’. This had
asserted a series of European aspirations to-
wards China, one of the most striking of which
was to work towards political transition and re-
form in the PRC, to help with the building of
rule of law, and to strengthen civil society.9
For a leadership in Beijing increasingly uneasy
about phenomenon like theColourRevolutions
in the former Soviet Union states that had oc-
curred from 2003 onwards, and the Jasmine
Revolutions in the Middle East from 2010, this
was statement of ominous intent. The govern-
ment under Xi Jinping from 2012 became even
more categorical about those seeking to work
within China and with Chinese partners in or-
der to forge what they called ‘domestic change’
unsupported by the Party state and potentially
threatening to it. The 2014 White paper on the
EU and China therefore does have an element
of rejection, and circumscription, of prior EU
positions and actions. There were areas where
deeper partnership was welcome, and areas
where it was rejected. The difference was that
China was clearer than ever before about where
it saw these to be, and wanted a relationship on
its terms, rather than on those of an outsider. In
particular, it was clear that China was not going
to take lectures about political reform and iden-
tity from an actor it clearly saw as weak and in-
coherent in this area.
3. Civilisational Partners
Despite these disagreements, the relationship
between the two was, and is hugely important
for a reason which is referred to, in different
ways, and for different reasons, in both the
2014 White Paper from Beijing and the 2006
Communication from Brussels: intellectual
partnership and knowledge links. The EU has
been China's largest technology transfer part-
ner, and has become from the period after
2000 one of its most signiﬁcant intellectual
property partners. Across the 28 EU member
states are some of the world's best universities,
and some of its most important technology
companies. The EU is also a globally important
producer of intellectual property. This was per-
haps why the failure to lift the arms embargo
had struck at China so deeply, because it felt
that the links in this realm could have become
even more powerful and important.
China is clearly suffering from an innova-
tion and technology deﬁcit. Its foreign earnings
from patents are a fraction of those of the
United States. Its proprietary Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights is simply not internationally attrac-
tive. The desire therefore to see greater results
in this area is tangible. The government does
have a 15-year innovation plan running from
2006. But as one analysis has made clear, this
privileges product innovation over process
and other forms. In that sense it is self-limiting,
showing something of the restraints of the sys-
tem in which partial innovation is being
attempted—allowing the embrace of economic
creativity, but still placing careful restraints in
political and social areas.10
Increasingly dense intellectual links, through
companies, students, and people to people in-
teraction have made it clear to the leadership
that a major relationship has been forged, and
one that while speciﬁc and important, has
transcended the traditional security or political
sphere. When Xi as the new president of
China after 2013 visited Brussels, the ﬁrst time
a Chinese Head of State had done so, in March
2014, he used very speciﬁc language to simul-
taneously acknowledge the difference between
the two but recognise their common interests.
9. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=celex:52006DC0631
10. See also Alice Rezkova, ‘Innovation in China’, in
Kerry Brown (ed), ‘The EU China Relationship:
European Perspectives: A Manual for Policy Makers’, Im-
perial College Press, London, 2014, pp. 383–380
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The EU and China, he declared, related to each
other as ‘civilisational powers.’ They did it on
the basis that both are ‘close to each other, as
if in the same neighbourhood. Both China and
Europe are in a crucial stage of development
and facing unprecedented opportunities and
challenges.’ Echoing the white paper, he went
on to say that they ‘need to build four bridges
for peace, growth, reform and progress of civi-
lization, so that the China-EU comprehensive
strategic partnership will take on even greater
global signiﬁcance.’11
Civilisational partners is a nice moniker. It
grants this disparate couple, one a group of 28
nation states, the other a ﬁscally centralised en-
tity with centrally proclaimed unity, a veneer of
commonality. The question is what precisely
these civilisational attributes might be. How
are they quantiﬁed and inwhat sensemight they
be meaningful? For the EU, too, it also raises
the possibility that they might now be able to
slip in Chinese judgements from being a com-
plex amalgam of economic strengths and polit-
ical and security weaknesses to something that
at least on some level is cohesive and has
something approaching political cohesiveness.
4. Market Economy Status
An opportunity to promote this more nuanced
face of the EU and what sort of actor it is re-
garding China is through the question of mar-
ket economy (ME)status being granted to
China, something that involves accepting
favourable tariffs and optimal market access.
In terms of trade ﬂows, as the ﬁgures given at
the head of this essay show, the EU and
China do well, but they could do a lot better.
For the EU the issue is the 100 billion Euros
plus in trade deﬁcit. It has so far failed to really
have its companies penetrate the Chinese do-
mestic market, despite being present almost
from the dawn of reform in 1978, and having
many European companies active in China
over the last four decades. For instance, of the
28 member states, only Germany has a trade
surplus with China.
Part of this is to do with EU economic
strengths. For major economies like the
United Kingdom, these are in the services sec-
tor, an area that has only in recent years truly
developed in the People's Republic. The EU
also currently lacks a bilateral free trade agree-
ment. How can, in the words of Chinese Pre-
mier Li Keqiang, the EU and China together
discover ‘new areas of growth’? In what ways
can their partnership work to deliver the differ-
ent kinds of growth that both are seeking –
sustainable, higher quality and more diverse?
ConferringME status might be one area, and
in 2016 its delivery might be imminent. It has
been a bugbear of Chinese ofﬁcials in their
complaints about the EU for a number of years.
It remains one of the very few things from the
EU that Chine really wants. Under World
Trade Organization, according to section
15(d) of the accession protocol, use of non-
market methodology towards China can expire
on 11 November 2016. The Chinese position is
that the EU has to grant ME status after that
date, although there is much argument about
this, with EU lawyers saying this is only sub-
ject to it fulﬁlling certain conditions. The one
issue there is more certainty about is that the
ﬁnal decision remains a largely political rather
than economic one.12 The paradox is that a
political decision (EU conferring of ME for
China) may well be the best route to a much
better economic relation. The issue is that up
till now, the EU has got the two the wrong
way around and striven for economic wins
ﬁrst, before going for political ones.
5. Potential Negative and Positive Impact
of Market Economy Status
Chinese ofﬁcials have gone on record with
claims that not getting ME status from
11. ‘Speech By H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's
Republic of China At the College of Europe’, 1st April
2014, ﬁle:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Kerry%
20Brown/My%20Documents/Downloads/
speech_by_xi_jinping%20(4).pdf
12. See ‘Granting Market Economy Status to China: An
Analysis of WTO Law and of Selected WTO Members’
Policy’, European Parliament, November 2015, at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/
571325/EPRS_IDA(2015)571325_EN.pdf
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Europe in 2016 would be to treat Chinese busi-
nesses in ‘unfair, unjust, unreasonable and dis-
criminative’ ways and would be ‘[an evasion
of] obligations under international treaty’.13 It
is clear that successful accession to ME status
by Beijing really matters to the Chinese Gov-
ernment. It would be viewed by them as a ma-
jor victory for the Communist Party diplomacy
on the international stage and would invigorate
support and prestige for their leadership.
Despite this, it is difﬁcult not to sympathise
with some of the arguments put forward in
the EU that once it had ME status conferred
on it. China would seek to exploit newly found
economic advantages that promote the eco-
nomic success of its existing exports into
Europe even more ruthlessly. In this context,
the deﬁcit in trade between the EU and China
might go up rather than down. China could,
for instance, set a higher natural value on the
exported goods of its companies into Europe,
thus dulling the effect of anti-dumping duties
and meaning that it could still ﬂood the market
competing with local ones which had been
made with high levels of state subsidy back in
the PRC. Under ME status, importing coun-
tries stand to lose the wide discretion granted
to them in their independent fair value calcula-
tions for anti-dumping purposes. As a non-
market economy now, China can have this
treatment but not after its status changes.
The position consistently held by the
European Commission which holds the com-
petency to undertake trade negotiations on be-
half of the EU14 is that Chinese Government
involvement in business amounts to a level of
intervention that substantively negates deserv-
ing market economy status. This includes
Chinese state ownership in a majority of
China's largest and most strategically impor-
tant enterprises, the entrenchment of top cadres
and their family members in signiﬁcant mana-
gerial posts and state ﬁnancing through state
ownership of state and commercial banks, for
example. Moreover, if China retains its non-
market economy status, there remains ﬂexibil-
ity in the methodology by which the market
value of Chinese products (in China) for im-
port can be calculated in anti-dumping regula-
tions. This is signiﬁcant in the European
position as it has politico-economic implica-
tions. The onus at the moment is on China to
prove ﬁrms are operating under market condi-
tions. The European Policy think tank in
Washington have forecast that, were China to
be allowed this favourable kind of access under
its current economic model, then the reduction
in EU outputs would potentially come to 1–2
per cent of gross domestic product,
jeapordising 1.7 million to 3.5 million jobs.15
It is for this reason that work unions and other
trade bodies in the EU have so far opposedME
status for China. On these grounds, therefore,
conferring ME status would be risky.
6. Conclusion
Despite this, the simple fact is that ultimately
the decision on granting ChinaME status is go-
ing to be primarily on political, not economic,
grounds.While the EU andChina performwell
in the economic realm, the pretence that they
can best relate to each other only in this area
is now largely untenable. Like it or not, their
relationship in the last two decades has grown
increasingly political. They are diplomatic ac-
tors with each other in the Middle East, allies
in the ﬁght against climate change and have a
vested interest in a stable global governance
and ﬁnance system. Through granting ME sta-
tus, the EU has the opportunity to strengthen
strategic ties with China which, while econom-
ically risky, do bring political rewards that will
eventually serve to upgrade their relationship,
probably quickly.
Not that the economic side is unimportant.
The EU does in 2016 need to seek more ur-
gently new areas of economic growth. In that
sense, it is in the same boat as China. A good
quality deal which might contain more means
for European companies to get access into
13. Statements made by Chinese foreign ministry
spokeperson Lu Kang in December, 2015. Link: http://
www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/HotTopics/fyrth/
t1328793.htm
14. But not that of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
or the Nordic countries, who accept China's market econ-
omy status. See https://euobserver.com/eu-china/131801 15. ibid
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China would be the optimum outcome. There
may be potential economic losses from
grantingME status, and the EUwould be mak-
ing a gamble. The issue is whether there is con-
ﬁdence that these can be offset againstmoreEU
penetration to Chinese markets. This is an issue
that the EU had to commit itself to, because the
impact of the transition being undertaken in
China towards a more service sector orientated
model would be one that clearly suited the EU's
strengths. Not doing everything to position it-
self competitively while others (like Australia,
for instance) are signing bilateral free trade
deals with the PRC means eroding its
competitive position. In the end, no one truly
knows what the impact of ME status for
China would be in Europe. But they do know
that without greater effort and something new
that reorders and reenergizes the relationship,
it risks becoming increasing moribund. As an
example of where politics takes precedence
over economics, this case is highly illustrative.
The rewards for both are higher if they concep-
tualise themselves in a different way rather than
just as mutual trade blocks. ‘Civilisational
powers’ might be one way of doing that.
August 2016.
The opinions expressed in the Policy Forum
are those of the authors alone and do not
necessarily reﬂect those of the Journal’s
Editors and partners.
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